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An unprecedented community outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) occurred in the Amoy
Gardens, a high-rise residential complex in Hong Kong.
Droplet, air, contaminated fomites, and rodent pests have
been proposed to be mechanisms for transmitting SARS in
a short period. We studied nasopharyngeal viral load of
SARS patients on admission and their geographic distribu-
tion. Higher nasopharyngeal viral load was found in
patients living in adjacent units of the same block inhabited
by the index patient, while a lower but detectable nasopha-
ryngeal viral load was found in patients living further away
from the index patient. This pattern of nasopharyngeal viral
load suggested that airborne transmission played an impor-
tant part in this outbreak in Hong Kong. Contaminated
fomites and rodent pests may have also played a role.
S
evere acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a rapidly
progressive pneumonia that affects all age groups in an
epidemic manner. The number of cases worldwide has
reached >8,000 with 774 deaths within a period of 9
months (1). A community outbreak affected 321 residents
of a densely populated housing estate, the Amoy Gardens
in Hong Kong, from March 20 to April 15, 2003 (2). This
housing estate consists of 19 high-rise apartment blocks
(A–S). Each block has 33 floors and 8 units per floor.
Residents from 15 blocks were affected. The mechanism
of the spread of SARS in Amoy Gardens has remained
enigmatic. The suggestion has been made that virus-laden
aerosols were forced from the sewage system by negative
pressure of an exhaust fan in an airshaft into the dried U
trap of the toilet in the bathroom of the index patient (3).
Results of another study in which computer modeling was
carried out without virologic proof suggested that these
contaminated aerosols were spread by natural air currents
to other apartment units (4). Other means of spread might
have been droplet transmission among residents or by
rodent pests (5).
In a recent study, mice experiments demonstrated that
viral load in respiratory specimens was proportional to
viral inocula in patients infected with SARS-associated
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (6). We hypothesized that the
initial nasopharyngeal viral load would be higher in
patients residing near the index patient and lower in
patients living further from the index patient. We analyzed
the distribution of the initial SARS-CoV viral load by
quantitative reverse transcription–polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) of nasopharyngeal aspirates of the first 79
SARS patients from Amoy Gardens admitted to our hospi-
tal. We also correlated the pattern of viral load with the
geographic distribution of these patients from Amoy
Gardens, which may indicate the mode of transmission in
this point-source outbreak.
Patients and Methods
From March 24 to March 29, 2003, the first 79 SARS
patients who lived at Amoy Gardens were admitted to the
United Christian Hospital in Hong Kong (Figure 1). Since
Amoy Gardens was placed under active surveillance by the
health authority soon after the first few cases of SARS
were detected, these patients underwent frequent examina-
tions and were admitted early in the course of their illness
(7). Their initial clinical signs and symptoms and progress
have been previously reported (7). We prospectively col-
lected demographic, clinical, and laboratory data from
these first 79 SARS patients from Amoy Gardens who
were admitted to the hospital. The diagnosis of SARS was
confirmed by World Health Organization clinical and lab-
oratory diagnostic criteria. SARS was defined clinically by
fever (temperature >38°C), cough or shortness of breath,
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Administrative Region, People’s Republic of Chinaand new pulmonary infiltrates on chest radiographs or by
high-resolution computed tomographic scans in the
absence of an alternative diagnosis to explain the clinical
manifestations. Positive SARS diagnostic findings includ-
ed at least 1 of the following: confirmation by a positive
PCR result for SARS-CoV, seroconversion by enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay or immunofluorescent anti-
body assay, or virus isolation in cell culture plus PCR
confirmation (7). 
Each apartment unit was coded according to block
(A–H) and unit (1–8) (Figure 2). Patients in 26 different
unit codes were affected. We retrospectively studied the
viral loads of the first nasopharyngeal aspirate taken on
the day of admission of the SARS patients who were
admitted within the first 6 days of the epidemic. We exam-
ined the relationship between the viral loads and the dis-
tribution of the patients in Amoy Gardens. The index
patient, who was responsible for transmitting the disease,
stayed for 2 days (March 14 and 19, 2003) in block E unit
7 (E7, floor 16) and infected his brother (4), our first
patient. The distance of the different block units from E7
was measured (Figure 2). Viral load was measured as
previously described (7,8). 
We compared the clinical characteristics and nasopha-
ryngeal viral load of these patients in different blocks by
chi-square test for categorical variables, Student t-test, or
Mann-Whitney U test for continuous variables where
appropriate. Correlation of nasopharyngeal viral loads in
relation to the distance from the index patient was calculat-
ed by Spearman correlation. The patients were categorized
into 5 subgroups according to the distance from the block
of the index patient for further analyses: block E7, block E
other than E7, blocks D and F, blocks C and G, and blocks
A, B, and H. All statistical analyses were performed with
SPSS version 12.0 software (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL,
USA). A2-tailed p value <0.05 was considered significant.
Results
The number of patients in the initial outbreak of SARS
in Amoy Gardens is shown in Figure 1. The demographic,
clinical, and laboratory characteristics of patients residing
in E block (where the index patient resided) and those
residing in non-E blocks were compared (Table). Seventy-
five patients (94.9%) were Chinese and 4 were Filipino.
There were 38 male and 41 female patients. The mean
(SD) age was 39.4 (11.5) years (range 20–72 years). Fifty-
three patients (67.1%) were residents of E block; 10
(12.7%) were residents of E7 and 25 (31.6%) were resi-
dents of E8. 
The relationships between viral load and distribution of
patients from E7 and E8 are shown in Figure 3A and B,
respectively. In E7, patients who resided within a few sto-
ries of the 16th floor had higher viral loads. For cases in
neighboring E8, the distribution of patients and viral loads
was random.
The median nasopharyngeal viral load in E block
patients (5.09 log10 copies/mL) was much higher than in
non-E block patients (0 log10 copies/mL) on admission
(p<0.001). On admission, no statistically significant differ-
ences were found between E block patients and non-E
block patients in terms of all demographic characteristics,
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Figure 1. Numbers of patients in the initial outbreak of severe
acute respiratory syndrome in Amoy Gardens admitted to United
Christian Hospital, Hong Kong, 2003. The index patient visited
Amoy Gardens on March 14 and March 19, 2003.
Figure 2. Scaled map of Amoy Gardens units and distribution of
the median viral load (log10 copies/mL) of the nasopharyngeal
specimens (values in boxes) of patients in their respective residen-
tial blocks (index patient lived in E7).
Viral Load Distribution in SARS Outbreakinitial radiographic findings, and baseline laboratory
results (Table). The mean day of collection of nasopharyn-
geal specimens from E-block and non-E block patients did
not differ significantly. Overall, the mean (SD) number of
days from onset of symptoms to collection of nasopharyn-
geal samples was 3.22 (1.5), and no correlation was found
between initial nasopharyngeal viral load and time elapsed
from symptom onset date to the day of sample collection
(Spearman ρ –0.16, p = 0.156).
Median viral loads of each unit of different blocks are
shown in Figure 2. The initial nasopharyngeal load of
patients was highly correlated with the distance in relation
to the block of the index patient (Spearman ρ –0.63,
p<0.001, Figure 4). The percentage of specimens with a
negative nasopharyngeal viral load in each block in order of
patient distance from block E was as follows: block E
(4/52) 7.7%; block D (4/7) 57.1%; block F (2/2) 100%;
block C (1/6) 15.2%; block G (2/2) 100%; block A (1/1)
100%; block B (2/6) 33.3%; and block H (1/1) 100% (p =
0.04 by chi-square test). Subgroup analysis showed that
patients in E7 and E8 had the highest median viral load,
6.80 and 5.98 log10 copies/mL, respectively. Patients from
these 2 units also accounted for 12.7% and 31.6% of the
total number of patients, respectively. This pattern of distri-
bution is strongly affected by the distance of the patients’
units from the index patient (Figures 2 and 4). On the basis
of a visual inspection of the layout of the units (Figure 2),
the direction in which patients’ flats faced may also have
influenced the viral load; patients in flats that faced away
from the index patient’s unit had a lower viral load.
The overall case death rate among the 79 patients was
24.1%. The highest rate was in block E, which accounted
for 79% of all deaths, while the death rate in patients liv-
ing in E7 (the same block as the index patient) was 70% (7
patients). This rate is significantly higher than in other
units (p = 0.001 by χ2 test). The index patient was one of
the few patients from E7 who survived the disease.
Discussion
In this study, a higher viral load was observed in patients
who lived near the index patient than in those who lived
further away. Amoy Gardens was placed under active sur-
veillance during the SARS outbreak and the residents
underwent frequent examinations. They were admitted to
the hospital soon after any symptom of SARS developed,
and nasopharyngeal specimens were collected at an early
stage. Variation in collection time cannot explain the viral
load distribution. The size of the viral inocula may have
progressively decreased downstream. A recent study has
demonstrated in mice that SARS-CoV viral load in the res-
piratory tract is proportional to viral inocula administered
intranasally (6). Similarly, the degree of viremia is related
to the size of the viral inoculum in HIV and hepatitis C
virus infections in various models (9,10). Three patients
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more severe disease than the index patient in E7 (Figure 3).
This finding can be explained by the fact that secondary
case-patients had probably received higher viral inocula
through droplets or close contact (11–14). The viral load
gradually decreased in tertiary patients who lived further
from the index case; dilution factors may have had an
effect. Moreover, the shape of the U trap and the warm
aerosol generated from the bathroom of the index patient
caused the aerosol to circulate upwards, which may explain
why only the upper floors of E7 were initially affected.
Subsequently the virus-laden aerosols cooled and sank. At
the same time, the virus was carried by a southwestward
wind to E8 and other parts of Amoy Gardens. This scenario
accounted for the higher rate and more widespread distribu-
tion of SARS patients in E8 than E7.
How SARS is transmitted is variously explained. In
most cases, SARS is transmitted by direct contact with ill
persons and spread of large droplets (15). In more distant
transmission, airborne spread, contaminated fomites, and
rodent pests can spread this disease (4,5,16). The initial
viral load pattern in our study may help explain the differ-
ent mechanisms involved in transmitting SARS in this out-
break. The highest nasopharyngeal viral load was detected
in patients residing in E7 and E8, which were near the unit
inhabited by the index patient. Direct contact transmission
with the index patient and droplet spread by cough may
have occurred among patients living in block E. Rodent
pests may have spread the virus in the same block or even
to distant blocks. Transmission by contaminated fomites
such as elevator door knobs or door handles would also
lead to spread among patients in the same block. 
The viral load of each patient correlated with the dis-
tance in relation to the index block (E7). However, more
patients and higher viral load were found in patients living
in block D than block F, in block C than block G, and in
block B than blocks Aand H, even though they were a sim-
ilar distance from the index block (Figure 2). The attack
rate was highest in block E, which accounted for 41% of
the 321 SARS cases in Amoy Gardens, followed by block
C (15%), block B (13%), and block D (13%). The remain-
ing cases (18%) were distributed in 11 other blocks (2).
This distribution pattern can be explained by airborne
transmission as virus-laden aerosols circulated inside the
complex and were driven by a southwestward wind from
block E to blocks D, C, and B (4). Meteorologic data from
The Hong Kong Observatory, Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region showed that the prevailing wind
direction on March 14 and March 19, 2003 was from the
southwest. This pattern is consistent with a hypothesis of
airborne transmission (17). Patients living in block D had
a lower viral load than those in blocks B and C, even
though they lived closest to the index patient. They may
have been protected by a nearby construction site (Figure
2), which created a shield against the virus-laden draft.
Patients from E7 living on floors 15–20 had higher viral
loads than those living above or below them (Figure 3A).
This distribution may be the result of a dilution effect as
the virus-laden plume rose from the middle floors to the
higher floors. Nonetheless, the airborne hypothesis is not
possible to prove because simultaneous air sampling and
analysis of the SARS viral load was not carried out.
Severity of illness did not differ between block E
patients and non-E block patients when they were first
seen at the hospital, despite higher viral load in block E
patients. However, the death rate was higher in block E.
We have previously demonstrated that patients with high
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Figure 3. Distribution of viral load in nasopharyngeal specimens
(log10 copies/mL) of Amoy Gardens residents in E7 (A) and E8 (B).
Figure 4. Correlation of nasopharyngeal viral load (log10
copies/mL) in relation to the distance from the index unit (E7). 
Viral Load Distribution in SARS Outbreakinitial and peak viral loads in nasopharyngeal samples
were more likely to show a less favorable disease course
and lower survival rate (8,18). Patients living in E7 who
had highest nasopharyngeal viral loads explains why their
death rate was higher than for those living in other units.
The dilution effect resulted in a decreased viral load as the
disease spread to other units and in a lower death rate.
Our study was limited because we analyzed only data
on the first 79 of 321 patients in Amoy Gardens with
SARS. This limitation was the result of the rapid influx of
patients who overwhelmed the capacity of our hospital;
additional patients were admitted to other hospitals for
treatment. Second, no human study has confirmed the rela-
tionship between the size of viral inocula and viral load.
Host factors are important in this regard (9). Nevertheless,
we believe that the patients we studied provide important
information regarding initial viral loads and geographic
factors. This situation involved different modes of trans-
mission, including direct contact, droplets, airborne, con-
taminated fomites, and rodent pests. No single mechanism
could explain such a major outbreak. 
In conclusion, the overcrowded housing complex,
unconnected pipes, a southwestward wind, rodent pests,
and arrival of the SARS index patient all created an envi-
ronment favorable for the transmission of this disease.
Different modes of transmissions apparently had a part in
this major outbreak. What actually took place will likely
remain unsolved. Nevertheless, the possibilities of differ-
ent modes of spread alert us to the importance of a multi-
component infection control policy in future outbreaks of
SARS-CoV infection, as well as in other respiratory viral
infections.
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